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Dewey, Mead, John Ford, and the
Writing of History
Pragmatist Contributions to Narrativism
Verónica Tozzi
“The writing of History is an instance of judgment




I. Narrativism and New Philosophy of History
1 The second half of the twentieth century has been witness to a blooming of reflections on
the status of historical writing, and specifically narrative writing.1 As opposed to previous
debates  within  critical  philosophy  of  history,  focused  on  the  adequate  relationship
between history and the natural sciences model,2 new philosophers of history detected
that  historicizing  the  past  in  narrative  terms  does  not  amount  to  scientific
underdevelopment, but is rather the expression of an autonomous form of knowledge.
The works of Arthur Danto (1985), Louis Mink (1987), Hayden White (1973), Paul Ricœur
(1983), Hans Kellner (1989), David Carr (1986),  and Frank Ankersmit (1983 and 2002),3
despite their many differences, converge precisely in considering that the tenacious use
of narration by historians does not stem from a didactic or ornamental choice, but rather
it is constitutive of our way of knowing the human past. Concretely, it is largely the result
of the persistent use of ordinary language that specifically describes occurrences of the
human  past in  intentional  vocabulary,  something  very  few  authors  would  willfully
forsake. The “language of motives” (another way of naming it) is undoubtedly riddled
with vagueness and ambiguity, and comes without a clear distinction between description
and value and between literal and figurative. But it is precisely due to such richness that
narration  offers  us  a  guarantee  to  understand the  human in  human terms.  Literary
theory and classical rhetoric have offered their own analysis of the diversity of figures
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and tropes that flood our everyday vocabulary; many of them even fossilize and thus
seem to describe rigidly and literally various parts of our world.4 
2 Their interest in the value of narrative to represent human past reality led all  these
theorists  to  inquire  into  the  complexities  of  historical  discourse  and  its  multiple
dimensions (factual or epistemic, its plot and its ideological implications). Some of them
focused  on  detecting  the  myriad  ways  or  styles  of  narrating  and  the  consequences
derived from such choices. Thus, the study of classical rhetoric coupled with the various
strands in literary theory5 could help us deploy the mechanisms and resources involved
in the production and circulation of narrative discourse. It is clear that, from this point of
view, historical narratives themselves become privileged objects of analysis, since they
allow us to identify their differences or similarities and thus contribute to elucidate the
conflicts that arise between them. Literary theory seems to be a powerful tool able to
orient us in the diversity of narrative styles and genres that historians have used since
the appearance of historical writing. It seems promising to apply such dispositive, created
for the analysis of literary works, to the analysis of something that goes beyond what we
consider in a strict sense “literary,” as is the case with disciplinary history. 
3 As a conclusion, it is unlikely that we can solve differences between competing historical
narratives by simply turning to an independent reality or exclusively to documentary
evidence, since when we present the past narratively there is much more at stake than
“mere reality” or “what really happened.”
4 Now,  these reflections have been read by critics  as  implying some kind of  linguistic
idealism  –  there  is  only  language  (a  version  of  Berkeleyan  idealism);  some  kind  of
linguistic determinism – whereby humans are spoken by language; antireferentialism –
historical knowledge does not refer to the past, it does not refer at all; and, finally, anti-
realism – the past historians speak about does not exist.6 As a consequence, we find an
“all’s fair” relativism which allows historians to say whatever they want about the past in
accordance with their particular interests, since writing about the past would be nothing
but “a literary or fictional exercise,” also putting rational discussion about competing
narratives to an end.
5 Nevertheless,  we  should  remember  that  NPH  does  not  deny  the  importance  of
documentary evidence in historical studies.7 The moral of narrativism is that one should
responsibly acknowledge the fact that every configuration of the past is not limited to
what already happened nor does it  abide by it,  and that  the choice among different
narratives is not solved by turning to some neutral body of evidence which could tell us
which were the events that actually took place in the past. Rather, when evaluating their
differences we will become involved in the deployment of all the implications of that
given configuration. And literary theory, the discipline which has taken as its subject
discourse  in  general  and  narrative  discourse  in  particular,  is  more  than  apt  as  an
instrument to guide us in deploying such consequences.8
6 These few observations allow us to identify the exact point where NPH is at this moment. 
In a few words, we could say that its achievements consist in having called attention to
historical  writing  in  itself,  and  reinforced  the  worth  of  an  autonomous  historical
knowledge  vis  à  vis  standard  conceptions  of  science  which  made  history  appear  as
underdeveloped. Now, although it is clear that NPH does not dismiss the importance of
documentary evidence, it did not produce an integrative account of both dimensions. In
other words, the work of writing and the work with evidence are not integrated as part of
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the same process of inquiry. Because, to some extent, they are slaves of some kind of
epistemological dualism. On one hand, they seem to remain in the representationalist
paradigm in the case of evidence, and, on the other hand, they only admit pragmatic and
practical (moral) criteria in the case of narrative discourse.
7 In this paper I suggest that John Dewey’s reflections9 on the writing of history, within the
framework of his logic of scientific inquiry, offer us (Narrativist Philosophers of History)
compelling  keys  for  a  rational  evaluation of  the  contributions  of  literary  theory  for
reconstructing  the  controversies  about  the  interpretation  of  the  past.  According  to
Dewey,  historical  writing consists  in  a  judgment  produced as  an answer to  concrete
problematic situations. The meanings of judgments about the past (historical narrations)
“have  a  future  reference  and  function”10 and,  as  a  consequence,  their  production,
understanding and justification involve deploying the consequences of accepting them. I
will show that these reflections allow us to consider literary theory as an unavoidable
instrument to navigate all the consequences that follow from the different descriptions of
the past. That is, the meaning of a proposition about the past does not refer exclusively to
a past event in itself; rather, it also refers implicitly to future processes of justification.
Insofar as history is writing, the science of writing (literary theory) is a key element to
reconstruct such processes (the consequences that follow from descriptions themselves).
Dewey’s contributions will also be complemented with the reflections of his friend and
colleague George H. Mead11 about the uselessness and, thus, irrationality, of believing in
the reality of a past independent from our present and from our inquiry processes. Why
do I  lay emphasis on rationality? Because by placing meaning in the very process of
inquiry,  instead  of  placing  it  in  reality  itself  (which,  by  the  way,  could  well  be
unattainable),  we commit  ourselves  to  being always  ready to  provide  new and good
reasons for our choices and take responsibility for their consequences.12
8 All of this leads us, on the one hand, to recognizing an explicit and proper pragmatist
philosophy of history that, in view of contemporary debates in the field, deserves to be
reconsidered.  This is  not a task for this  paper but I  need to point out that its  main
proponents, Mead and Dewey, are absent precisely in the debates of a discipline that is
not shy about reading the classics. On the other hand, it is urgent to move forward in the
development of a narrativist, pragmatistically-informed philosophy of history. This is the
task that I effectively try to accomplish in this article. The alliance of narrativism with
pragmatism will reinforce the most provocative – and thus more productive – thesis of
the former: that the means of production of historical writing are central to elucidating
controversies about the past. In my pragmatist reconstruction, narrativism affirms that
the meaning of discourses about the past is not unveiled as a result of its representative
relation to past reality (independently from our instruments of “representation”), but
rather in terms of the future consequences of accepting such discourses as answers to
problems that emerged in the context of our current practices of inquiry.
9 I  have  chosen  to  unfold  the  importance  of  the  contribution  of  Dewey  and  Mead  to
narrativism through the analysis of the controversial case of a past event which inspired
the memorable film The man who shot Liberty Valance.
 
II. The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance
10 I will begin by taking up the example of a concrete problem about the past posed by
filmmaker John Ford in his memorable 1962 film The man who shot Liberty Valance.13
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11 Old Senator Ransom Stoddard (James Stewart) returns to Shinbone, a city in the West
where he had lived in his youth, right after finishing Law school in the East. He comes
back  to  attend  the  burial  of  Tom  Doniphon  (John  Wayne),  who  in  1910  was  an
inconspicuous man. Stoddard, on the other hand, is famous in Shinbone for being the one
who, 25 years before, had shot dead the toughest thug of those times, Liberty Valance
(Lee Marvin, henceforth LV).
12 A young journalist from the local newspaper, very excited about Stoddard’s visit, requests
an interview, which gives place to a long flashback taking us back to 1885 Shinbone. The
town was driven by a typical western end-of-the-century conflict: powerful landowners
who defend their “freedom” to use open lands for their cattle, against small farmers who
demand State intervention to establish statehood. The main characters of this drama are
Stoddard himself, supporting law and opposing the use of weapons, and Tom Doniphon, a
local  rancher,  involuntary  protector  of  the  town  due  to  his  expertise  in  handling
firearms. The conflict focuses on how to confront Liberty Valance, the landlords’ thug
who harasses  small  farmers  into  giving their  lands  away or  selling  them for  almost
nothing. 
13 The story goes that Stoddard must force himself, against his principles, to accept a duel
set against Liberty Valance. He shoots him dead, becomes a hero, and is chosen as town
delegate for the State convention, which will be held to decide between open land or
statehood. These events were followed by a great political and economical development
in the town, and Stoddard builds up a prominent political career, which eventually leads
him to the United States Senate.
14 Within Stoddard’s  flashback narrative we are led to a second flashback,  in which he
appears  tormented  for  having  violated  his  convictions,  and  unwilling  to  represent
Shinbone. His conscience does not tolerate the fact of having killed a man. In a succession
of scenes not unlike the well-known series Law and Order, Doniphon reconstructs the
shooting,  revealing  to  Stoddard  that  in  the  same second  in  which  he  shot  his  gun,
Doniphon himself had shot his rifle, and it was the latter who killed LV. In this way,
Doniphon cleaned Stoddard’s conscience and suggested he did not disclose the “truth” in
order not to interrupt the process that followed.
15 Back in 1910, Stoddard begs journalists to publish the truth in the newspaper: that it was
not the bullet from his gun that killed LV, but the one shot by Doniphon with his rifle. In
this way, Stoddard hopes to grant his place in history to the forgotten Doniphon. The
youngest of them cannot wait to get the news in print, and this is when the old journalist
pronounces the now memorable phrase “when the legend became fact, print the legend.”
16 The case presented in this film is a clear example that illustrates our subject of inquiry,
since it is founded on the presupposition that it is possible to distinguish clearly between
the true and the useful. True is what is independent of our contexts and interests, and
useful is what is convenient for an individual or a collective in a certain context. The old
journalist’s sentence, “when the legend…,” obviously implies that he has chosen to solve
the matter of who killed LV according to what is more convenient for the community of
Shinbone, and for modern democracy in general, which needs heroes like Stoddard (a
man of law) and not like Doniphon (a gunman). Moreover, one could suppose that the
journalist knows the truth but prefers to conceal it; that after Stoddard’s account he had
the choice of bringing to light what really happened, but does not. Finally, we could also
say that the journalist could have considered that the best option for the present times of
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his community was to tell the truth.14 All three options carry the unspoken assumption
that – leaving aside the moral or political meaning of the stories, or their usefulness – one
of them is false and the other one is not, and that this is determined by reference to what
happened in 1885. Independently of how we understand usefulness or the lack of it (in
moral or in plainly political terms), and independently of which are the winding paths of
the proof, evidence or confessions we could collect, we must recognize that whatever
makes our descriptions of the past true, it demands that an event happened before them.
17 In the next section, we will see the possibilities of clearly demarcating this event that
serve  as  reference for  the  affirmation in  past  tense,  and its  role  in  deciding among
conflicting affirmations by following pragmatist considerations.
 
III. Dewey and the Writing of History 
18 Dewey  addresses  historical  writing  in  the  chapter  “Judgment  as  Spatial-Temporal
Determination: Narration-Description” (1938), a part of his logic of judgments.15 That is,
in the context of his logic of inquiry and of the theory of the temporal and historical
phase of judgment (see Dewey 1938: 246, 247). As a consequence, the specifically historical
dimension of judgment, of inquiry and of the act of knowing in general come to light. His
reflections  primarily  display the situated and active  nature of  inquiry.  The situation
frames a problem that must be addressed by a future resolution. Specifically, a judgment
“consists in the transformation of the existentially indeterminate or unsettled situation
into a determinate one […]. It refers to a total qualitative situation” (Dewey 1938: 220).
19 This  is  a  remarkable  text,  as  it  reveals  how  deeply  aware  our  author  was  of  the
impregnable place the past holds in our lives. In this respect, he analyzes three cases of
judgments about the past: namely, cases a) about one’s personal past; ii) about special
events that are not included in one’s own experience; and iii) historical narrations (the
ones that define historical inquiry or history as a science), noting the fact that in all
dimensions in life,  the past  is  always there and calls  for  us.  For the pragmatist,  the
question about knowing the past is not a mere philosophical game; it is a vital problem to
tackle,  and this  is  why it  should be formulated in a  way that  allows for  an answer.
Addressing  the  issue  of  the  results  of  inquiry  in  terms  of  judgments,  instead  of
propositions or sentences, is no minor detail either. Rather, it shows that we are thinking
about the results of a concrete practice, stemming from a concrete problem – in our case,
in relation to past events –, the solution of which, from the point of view of his logic of
inquiry, must follow a number of requirements which will be specified throughout the
inquiry itself. And this is where a common misunderstanding in relation to pragmatism
must be avoided. This is not about reducing inquiry to a mere satisfaction of interests or
to merely answering a question that emerges in a given context. What an analysis in
terms of the logic of inquiry mandates is that, in order to evaluate any solution, we must
come to terms with the consequences of accepting it.  And this is why the process of
justification and criticism is open, and not dogmatically sealed. 
20 “To judge is to render determinate; to determine is to order and organize, to relate in
definite fashion” (Dewey 1938: 221). The determination thus reached stemmed from a
concrete  problematic  consideration,  and  therefore  the  resulting  order  cannot  be
evaluated without contextualizing it within the problem or situation that motivated it.
Analyzing judgment (the ordering) in relation to an alleged reality independent from our
ordering  practices  gives  us  no  orientation  as  to  how  to  evaluate  such  order.  The
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representationalist strategy is based on a clear distinction between semantic problems
(the relationship between representation and reality) and epistemic problems (criteria to
find out whether the representation represents reality). On the other hand, it tends to
focus  on  the  singular  existential  proposition  which  describes  singular  events  as  an
example or  case of  representation.  According to Dewey,  such a  strategy provides  no
orientation as to how to distinguish adequate solutions to our problems of inquiry from
unacceptable ones.16
21 Dewey characterizes judgments about the past as those in which temporal considerations
are dominant. Their common trait is that they explicitly establish temporal connections:
this phase is linguistically expressed in narration,17 through which “a limiting reference
to both past  and future is  present  in every existential  proposition [that  stresses  the
temporal phase of a judgment…]. Without this limitation, a change is not characterized or
qualified” (Dewey 1938: 221).
22 The subject  matter  of  any particular  narration-description is  determined by a  “from
which” and a “to which,” and these limits are “strictly relative to the objective intent set
to inquiry by the problematic quality of a given situation” (Dewey 1938: 221). When the
verbal  expression of  an existential  judgment has the past  as its  explicit  content,  the
meaning of such judgment is not a past event. Expecting to analyze meaning in terms of
the relationship between atomic sentences and mutually isolated events is completely
arbitrary. This is because, for Dewey, any statement about the past (be it about my past,
or about an event of which I had no experience, or even about a very remote event I could
not possibly have experienced), if empirically gronded, will be mediated, and will depend
on probatory data (see Dewey 1938: 223). It should be noted, however, that the issue of
the  ground  or  justification  is  not  external  to  meaning:  this  is  the  key  step  in  his
argumentation. At first sight, singular propositions refer to isolated events (see Dewey
1938: 223). But “were the facts as isolated when the latter is separated from context, the
latter would have no more meaning than if uttered by a parrot, and were the sentence
uttered by a phonograph, its meaning would be fixed by the context, say of the story or
dramatic reproduction in which it appears” (Dewey 1938: 225). In other words, in order to
understand any statement that has the past as an explicit object, we need to display its
temporal depth, and the conditions of proof for what is said in relation to a concrete
problem – that is, it involves in its meaning the unfolding of inquiry itself.
23 In the end,  as Dewey already stated sixteen years before,  “the past by itself  and the
present  by itself  are both arbitrary selections which mutilate the complete object  of
judgment” (Dewey 1922: 314). “[T]he past incident is part of the subject-matter of inquiry
which enters into its object only when referred to a present or future event or fact”
(Dewey 1922: 314). Furthermore, “event is a term of judgment, not of existence apart from
judgment” (Dewey 1938: 222). This is why when Dewey claims that “In denying that the
past event is as such the object of knowledge, it is not asserted that a particular present
or future object is its sole and exhaustive object, but that the content of past time has a
future  reference  and  function”  (Dewey  1922:  314).  He  is  not  granting  metaphysical
priority to the present or to present experience, nor to merely flowing, as judgments or
knowledge always involve a connection,  “and,  where time enters in,  a  connection of
present with past and future” (Dewey 1983: 47).18
24 Dewey’s observations on historical judgment should not seem strange or out of place to
our  great  twentieth-century  philosophers  of  history,  Collingwood,  Gadamer,  Ricœur,
White,  Danto  and  Mink.  Nevertheless,  it  is  surprising  that,  despite  their  family
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resemblances, Danto criticized them fiercely and Mink ignored them altogether. Dewey
reflects on the cognitive status of history by wondering: “Upon what grounds are some
judgments about a course of past events more entitled to credence than are certain other
ones?” (Dewey 1938: 230). Whether it is possible or not to formulate fully guaranteed
judgments about the remote past (the skeptic’s problem), or if history is a science or not,
are matters of no interest to him. Let us quote once again Dewey’s precept: “the writing
of history is an instance of judgment as a resolution through inquiry of a problematic
situation” (Dewey 1938:  231).  If  this  is  the case,  then his  concrete question refers to
accepting some (narrative) structures instead of others. Now, although judgments and
narrations are made of existential propositions, the meaning of each proposition cannot
be isolated from the process of inquiry, nor from its relation to the initial problem. But
this trait is not exclusive to history: it in fact belongs to scientific inquiry in general. The
logic  of  inquiry  recognizes  that  every  existential  proposition  must  operate  “(1)  as
material for locating and delimiting a problem; (2) as serving to point to an inference that
may be drawn with some degree of probability; or (3) as aiding to weigh the evidential
value of  some data;  or  (4)  as  supporting and testing some conclusion hypothetically
made”  (Dewey 1938:  231).  That  is,  the  meaning  of  the  existential  proposition  is  not
determined by an independent event or occurrence, but by its role in inquiry. In the
specific case of history, existential propositions about facts established under conditions
of maximum control (as a result of inquiry in auxiliary sciences) are indispensable “but
they are not in their isolation historical propositions at all” (Dewey 1938: 232). It is only in
reference to a concrete historical problem that they will become historical propositions.19
25 This leads us to consider what constitutes a concrete historical problem. In broad terms,
and according to common sense, historical inquiry is defined as “giving an account of
what actually happened” or “determining what and why something happened in the
past.” But we will not find clear and sufficiently broad notions of “what really happened”
and “giving an account of” without referring to the concrete contexts in which inquiry is
posed. In relation to this, Dewey was well aware of the self-consciousness that historians
themselves show in relation to the selective and presentist nature of historical narratives:
“All historical construction is necessarily selective” (Dewey 1938: 234, emphasis added). “The
slightest reflection shows that the conceptual material employed in writing history is
that of the period in which a history is written” (Dewey 1938: 232-3) Therefore, “if the
fact  of  selection is  acknowledged to be primary and basic,  we are committed to the
conclusion that all history is necessarily written from the standpoint of the present, and
is,  in an inescapable sense,  the history not  only of  the present  but  of  that  which is
contemporaneously judged to be important in the present” (Dewey 1938: 234).
26 In view of the observations made thus far, it is crucial to look into an assertion on the aim
of historical inquiry that is more familiar to historians: that is, the reference of history to
what “actually happened in this way.” According to our philosopher, such a statement
“has its status and significance within the scope and perspective of historical writing”
(Dewey 1938: 236). And, strictly speaking,
it is a warning to avoid prejudice […] an exhortation to exercise caution and
skepticism in determining the authenticity of material proposed as potential data
[…]. It does not determine the logical conditions of historical propositions, much
less  the  identity  of  these  propositions  with  events  in  their  original  occurrence.
(Dewey 1938: 236) 
27 Now, from my point of view, there is something that must be clarified in relation to this
particular issue. Acknowledging that the meaning of “what really happened” is relative to
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a certain perspective is not to say that its value is limited to what is useful or satisfactory.
Rather, this perspective urges us to pay attention to the consequences that follow from
establishing “what really happened” in the context of inquiry. The specific criteria and
reasons of our context of inquiry, in which “what really happened” is stated, are a part of
the very meaning of that statement. This is precisely why the display of consequences is a
never ending business, and it lacks a predetermined direction. Dewey himself notes that
one of the main principles in the logic of historical inquiry is that “the writing of history
is itself an historical event. It is something which happens and which in its occurrence
has existential consequences” (Dewey 1938: 236). “As culture changes, the conceptions
that are dominant in a culture change” (Dewey 1938: 233). “History is then rewritten […]
the new conceptions propose new problems for solution” (Dewey 1938: 233).
28 Ultimately, his reflections tried to shed light on “the inadequacy and superficiality of the
notion that since the past is its immediate and obvious object, therefore, the past is its
exclusive and complete object” (Dewey 1938: 237). The past to which our books of history
refer is “of logical necessity the past-of-the-present,  and the present is the-past-of-a-
future-living  present”  (Dewey  1938:  237).  As  active  beings  who  interact  with  our
environment, we must deal with a double process. On the one hand, the ever changing
environment (natural or social) which throws “the significance of what happened in the
past into a new perspective” (Dewey 1938: 238). But, on the other hand, our own activity
of inquiry is under constant change, and inasmuch as judgments about the meaning of
the past change, those new judgments themselves are, for Dewey, new instruments “for
estimating the force of present conditions as potentialities of the future” (Dewey 1938:
238).  We need to erase any association of inquiry and narration with images such as
building a puzzle with fixed pieces:  “No historic present is  a mere redistribution,  by
means of permutations and combinations, of the elements of the past” (Dewey 1938: 238).
Inquiring about the past, narrating it, is a problem-solving activity, and as Dewey has
aptly indicated, “men have their own problems to solve […]. In using what has come to
them as an inheritance from the past they are compelled to modify it to meet their own
needs, and this process creates a new present […]. History cannot escape its own process”
(Dewey 1938: 238).20
 
IV. Danto’s Criticism and a Possible Pragmatist
Answer 
29 In his great book Analytical Philosophy of History, narrativist philosopher Arthur Danto has
taken note of the reflections brought by pragmatists such as Lewis and Dewey as cases of
skepticism in relation to the past.21 Historical statements are not about past events; they
are predictions about research procedures and their results. For example, the statement
“yesterday there was a fire in the car factory” would not be about yesterday and a fire,
but rather about twisted metals, smell of smoke, ashes, and so on – that is, traces that
would clue us in on the event. What is the problem here? Given that the procedures for
detection  will  take  place  after  the  historian  formulates  the  historical  statement,  its
meaning refers to the future, not the past. In Danto’s reading, a pragmatist would say that
historical  statements are ultimately undercover predictions,  and what they predict is
relevant evidence.
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30 According to Danto, the arguments put forth by Lewis and Dewey are skeptical in kind.
Not only do they attest the outworn belief that we only know about the past that cannot
be witnessed, based on proof; but also, when I formulate a statement about the past, I am
implicitly predicting the experiences I will have in the future if and only if I undertake
certain actions, “and Lewis’ mistake is to suppose that this is all I am doing, that the
whole of my cognitive claims are expressed in conditional sentences of the sort we have
recognized”  (Danto  1985:  43).  That  is,  we  do  something  more,  something  that  the
pragmatist withholds from the historian, or withholds from all of us: namely, that we
speak about the past, that we know the past or that our statements express knowledge
about the past. As Danto explained in “Historical Language and Historical Reality” (Danto
1985), they specifically confuse or fail to distinguish two ways in which language relates
to the world through (a) a part-whole relationship, that is, by belonging to the inventory
of reality, and capable of sustaining causal relationships, and (b) an external relationship
to reality in its entirety, in its representative function, capable of sustaining semantic
values (true and false) (see Danto 1985: 305).
31 There is an inside and an outside of reality: paintings, maps, concepts, ideas, art have – as
does  language  –  this  twofold  relationship  with  the  world.  The  particular  case  of
“historical language” (that is,  the sentences which, when stated, aim at describing an
event previous to its utterance or inscription), implies as truth condition, a sentence in
the past tense. “Fernández is an ex-president” implies, first of all, that “Fernández was a
president.” Secondly, satisfying this truth condition implies in turn the actual occurrence
of some event previous to its utterance. In sum, historical sentences lie, by their own
nature, in history; if they are true, they are actually subsequent to the events described in
them.  Nevertheless,  in  their  attempt  to  describe  the  past,  historical  sentences  are
external to the past, and claim to be true. Therefore, the fact that historical sentences
allow for temporal, truthful connections with the events they describe is a symptom that
historical sentences are within and without the reality they describe, and this is why their
combined semantics generates problems in philosophy of history (see Danto 1985: 311-4).
32 The utterance “to be historical” does not add any further information about the event (it
belongs to what it isolated as language in its relation to the world as part-whole, not as an
occurrence  in  the  world).  It  does  not  add  information  on  the  external  descriptive
relationship between language and reality (in its representative function). 
33 What makes a sentence true is not affected by the moment in which such sentence is
uttered.  As  Danto  has  argued  extensively  in  his  famous  piece  “Narrative  sentences”
(Danto 1985: 143-82), temporal distance of historians and their retrospective position give
them an advantage to truthfully know what happened. The possibility of formulating true
statements about  the past  only comes by later,  and sometimes much later,  than the
occurrences. But whatever it is that makes them true does not depend on those who are
able to find it out or prove it.
34 In  short,  we  are  faced  with  two  ways  of  approaching  the  question  of  the  correct
representation  of  the  past:  (1)  What  is  the  relationship  between representation  and
reality?;  and  (2)  how  can  we  legitimately  represent  the  past  or  reality?22 The  first
question begins with the establishment of two different ontological orders; the aim is to
connect  them,  in  order  to  unveil  the  conditions  for  knowing  the  past.  Worse  still,
pragmatism grants skeptics their conclusion about the futility of the realist pretense that
past events in themselves are not only an object of our knowledge, but also the references
of  our  sentences.  Now,  at  this  point  we  should  remind  Danto  that  it  is  precisely
Dewey, Mead, John Ford, and the Writing of History
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
9
pragmatism  that  questions  the  possibility  of  isolating  the  meaning  of  any  given
proposition from its context of utterance, which includes the question that is answered
by the proposition. Determining the past event that serves as reference is the very result
of the research, not its starting point.23
35 These  observations  deserve  a  last,  critical  clarification.  Danto,  as  an  analytical
philosopher  of  ordinary  language,  approaches  the  subject  with  an  analysis  of  “the
sentence in the past  tense” (the narrative sentence),  whereas  Dewey,  whose work is
previous to the linguistic turn, approaches the matter in terms of “judgments about the
past.” This does not stop Danto from applying his criticism, nor does stop us from taking
part  to  the  discussion.24 Strictly  speaking,  for  Danto  beliefs,  sentences  (language),
theories,  judgments,  belong  to  the  realm  of  representation,  which  is  ontologically
heterogeneous from reality (Danto 1985: 311). In this respect, the relevant question in
relation  to  our  knowledge  of  the  past  is  to  elucidate  the  relationship  between
representation and reality (that is: what makes a representation true?), which should be
distinguished from the epistemic problem of how to know whether the events actually
occurred. Let us return once more to Dewey’s words:
The propositions that are accumulated about past facts and facts now observable
are but means to the formation of this historic narrative judgment. In themselves
they are so many separate items. (Dewey 1938: 229) 
36 To which he immediately adds:
There is no such thing as judgment about a past event, one now taking place, or one
to take place in the future in its isolation. The notion that there are such judgments
arises  from  taking  propositions  that  are  indispensable material  means  to  a
completely determined situation as if they were complete in themselves. (Dewey
1938: 230)
37 In Danto’s view, pragmatism is skeptical, but we should add that it is so in relation to the
possibility of answering affirmatively to a requirement that is posed by skepticism itself:
showing  a  reality  independent  from  our  beliefs  (something  necessary  to  rebut
skepticism). Nevertheless, it is my understanding that the most important point to stress
about  this  debate  is  that  pragmatism  is  rather  skeptical  about  the  possibility  that
proposals such as Danto’s play any concrete role for solving concrete historiographical
problems  or  controversies.  Is  this  Dantian  answer  the  only  way  to  solve  rationally
(without resorting to force, or deception) the problems related to the representation of
the past? It is time to settle these issues by returning to the question about who killed LV.
 
V. Which Bullet Caused the Victim’s Death? 
38 Let  us  analyze  an  array  of  descriptions  regarding  Liberty  Valance’s  death,  and then
compare Danto’s position with the one defended by Dewey.25
1. The bullet in the revolver caused the victim’s death.
2. The bullet in the rifle caused the victim’s death.
3. Senator Stoddard is the man who killed LV (in 1910).
4. Stoddard killed LV.
5. Doniphon killed LV.
6. The bullet that killed LV came out of Stoddard’s revolver.
7. By shooting LV, Stoddard turns Shinbone into a modern, democratic city.
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8. This bullet turned Shinbone into a modern, democratic city
39 Danto would analyze these eight sentences by distinguishing.
a. Semantic issues, which are sub-divided into:
a.i) meaning,
a.ii) their truth value,
a.iii) the satisfaction of their truth value.
b. Epistemic issues, that is, the concrete conditions of proof or verification of the sentences.
40 All these different descriptions (1 to 8) share the same grammar, as they are in the past
tense (or in the historical present tense, as in sentences 3 and 7) and, as such, they talk or
are about the past. Nevertheless, according to Danto, not all of them do it in the same
way, and as a consequence not all could be uttered truthfully by anyone at any point in
time. They all speak about an event which is previous to their utterance, but not in the
same manner. Sentences 3, 7, and 8, for instance, are an example of what Danto called
narrative sentences: sentences that describe a past event in terms of another one that
happened later in time, perhaps even at the time of utterance.26 As a consequence, the
contemporary subject would be as such unable to know its truth (the issues addressed in
point b); an eyewitness would not be able to affirm it truthfully at the moment of the
occurrence.27 But  in every case the meaning of  the sentence includes  or  implies  the
occurrence of a past event. 
41 I would like to draw attention to the case of narrative or historical sentence number
seven.  It  entails  as  a  truth  condition,  following  Danto,  a  sentence  such  as  4  or  6,
depending on whether we describe the event in physicalist or in intentionalist terms.
And, in turn, the satisfaction of its truth requires that an event described in the terms of
such sentence must have actually taken place. Let us take a close look. Sentences 1 to 8
describe some event in the past (again, at this stage we are not asking whether this is the
same event under different descriptions, or different events altogether). The important
issue here is that at first sight there are differences between them in relation to the
language game chosen to talk about reality in general, and social reality in particular.
42 1  and  2  describe  events  in  a  physicalist  language,  which  mainly  reveals  the  causal
relationships between them.
43 3, 4, 5, and 7 clearly describe actions, are presented in an intentionalist language, and are
understood within a teleological structure, formulated as means-to-ends.
44 6 is ambiguous or unclear as to its status, since it could mean both that Stoddard himself
purposefully killed LV with a shot, or that the bullet came out of his revolver in a series of
defensive moves (not necessarily voluntary),  whereas Stoddard did not want to shoot
him.
45 For  Danto,  one  event  can  bear  different  descriptions,  both  in  relation  to  its  being
described in an intentional  language or  a  physicalist  one (what  is  usually  called the
language  of  events,  as  something  different  from  actions)  and  in  relation  to  the
subsequent “redescriptions produced by its consequences in the future of its occurrence”
(as in the case of narrative sentences).
46 Reference,  meaning,  or that of which the statement speaks and makes it  true,  is  the
occurrence of the event. At this stage we could say that Danto is bound to an idea of event
without a description, or the idea of a basic description of an event. Either way, we are
faced with the need to clarify what an event without a  description or a  basic  event
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description would be. This last point, to which Danto’s argument leads us, is the one that
will prove problematic for a non-skeptical consideration of our knowledge of the past: it
leads us to posit a reference for historical sentences that is unaccessible in itself, and
therefore cannot be our guarantee for rejecting skepticism.
47 What would a pragmatist interested in historical narrative or a pragmatically informed
narrativist say? In search of an example,  we can go back to the case of narrative or
historical sentence number seven. Following Danto, we would say that it entails as its
truth condition a sentence such as 1,  4,  or 6 (depending on whether we describe the
events in physicalist or in intentionalist terms), and the satisfaction of its truth requires
that an event described in the terms of such sentence must have actually taken place.
Now, what do we mean when we say that the three sentences refer to the same event, be
it narratively or not, be it in physicalist or intentionalist language? What lies at the basis
of every description, making it true? How do we determine whether the sentence implied
in 7 is the first – “The bullet in the revolver caused the victim’s death” –, the fourth –
“Stoddard  killed  LV”  –,  or  the  sixth  one?  –  “The  bullet  that  killed  LV came out  of
Stoddard’s revolver.” Do we decide it by referring to the occurrence or to the future
implications of the description, whichever it is? What is more, choosing one or the other
has important consequences, be it by allotting responsibility or by alleviating it (a lost
bullet). In other words, here we see clearly why, according to pragmatism, the meaning of
any empirical sentence about the past or in the past tense, refers to the future. Now we
can understand Dewey when he says that 
The past occurrence is not the meaning of the propositions. It is rather so much
stuff upon the basis of which to predicate something regarding the better course of
action  to  follow,  the  latter  being  the  object  meant.  It  makes  little  difference
whether the past episode drawn upon is reported with literal correctness or not.
(Dewey 1922: 43-4)
48 This is the case for those sentences that describe events in a physicalist language, in an
intentionalist one, or in narrative descriptions (inaccessible to contemporary subjects).
Their  correct  meaning  cannot  be  decoupled  from  the  future  consequences  of  such
descriptions.
49 In 1929 Lewis noted that meaning and truth of an empirical statement – such as number 1
in our example: “The bullet in the revolver caused the death of the deceased” – entails
the fact that “To ascribe an objective quality to a thing means implicitly the prediction
that if I act in certain ways, specificable experience will eventuate” (Lewis 1929: 140). In
our case, if I believe that a certain bullet caused this death, we should be able to detect
certain marks in the body, the rifle, and so on, and these actions are subsequent to the
alleged occurrence of the atomic event. But the same thing would happen if we move in
the  context  of  intentionalist  language:  we  would  always  assign  properties  or  offer
descriptions  which,  by  assuming  them,  engage  us  with  other  descriptions  and  with
registering or collecting certain testimonies. In short, summarizing the debate, Danto and
the pragmatists (Dewey and Lewis in the case at hand) would agree on the complexity of
determining who killed LV, since this requires us to:
1. decide the language in which the matter will be addressed (physicalist or intentionalist);
2. search for  relevant  evidence,  and in the specific  terms of  whichever  language game we
adopt (physicalist or intentionalist);
3. finally, with regards to whether we want to or must reveal (or not) which bullet killed LV, or
caused  the  death,  or  whatever,  accept  that  these  are  matters  settled  in  terms  of
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consequences and evidence.  Moreover,  they are not settled once and for all,  and can be
reopened over and over again, from the present of whoever intends to reopen it.
50 The  fundamental  difference  is  that  Danto  believes  that  if  we  do  not  preserve  a
consideration of  reference as  something different  from justification,  we will  fall  into
skepticism.
51 To this,  pragmatism would answer that  the  notion of  an event  as  reference for  our
statements leads us to skepticism, since it brings into the historically relevant discussion
about who killed LV a component that is not accessible in itself for those involved in the
discussion,  and  therefore  in  the  long  run  it  does  not  hold  any  concrete  role  when
choosing a solution to the problem.
52 For the pragmatists, Danto’s commitment to an event as the referent for statements in
past tense, and thus previous to the formulation of the problem, does not add or subtract
anything to the resolution of the matter. On the contrary, the meaning of a proposition in
the past tense is not limited to an alleged reference without description, or with some
kind of basic or contextually neutral description. It refers implicitly to socially shared
procedures  of  justification in  the  future.  My main point  here  has  been to  show the
inextricable  bond  between  that  pragmatist  argument and  the  detailed  and  rich
considerations offered by literary theory about the variety of  descriptions offered by
intentional language, and their consequences. In his classic A Grammar of Motives, Kenneth
Burke wonders: 
What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?”
And “any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these
five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it
(agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose). (Burke 1945: XV)
53 Not only are the various combinations of possible answers determined by the events in
themselves, but they also reveal different conceptions of the world. And again, which
conception we choose will have practical consequences for life.28
54 Why  would  this  be  a  case  of  skepticism?  According  to  Danto,  because  it  has  not
presupposed a reality independent of the past as a referent for our statements about it. It
is time to address this issue with the help of Mead.
 
VI. Mead and the Re-Writing of History
55 Philosophers  have repeatedly addressed a  playful  skeptical  argument about  the past,
according to which it is logically possible that the world as we know it, even with our
memories and fragments of evidence of times past, was created a few minutes ago (five or
thirty, little changes).29 If this is the case, statement as “Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon
in 49 B.  C.” or “my mother was born in 1937” lack a reference;  therefore,  either all
statements are false,  or the problem of their truth will  not emerge. In order for this
argument to hold, it is not necessary that the world actually started a few minutes ago;
we only need to be able to imagine the possibility that it did. It could have started a few
minutes ago or not, we can have success or not when talking truthfully about the past,
but unfortunately if we follow this argument, we cannot know whether it started or not,
whether we will be able to say true things about the past or not, because all evidence is
compatible with either possibility. Now, if this argument is unassailable, its reach is so
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broad that it would not only affect historical knowledge, but knowledge of all kind. In
conclusion, we cannot doubt history without putting at risk our beliefs across the board.30
56 In his “The present as the locus of reality,” included in the posthumous publication The
Philosophy of the Present, George H. Mead addresses the skeptical argument31 inquiring the
relevance of the existence of a past independent from the present for our experience, and
for that of the scientist and the historian. What difference would it make to our inquiry,
were we to accept not only the reality of the past, but also its irrevocability, regardless of
what happened later on? What would it be the importance of the idea that nothing that
happened after the occurrence of  that past  would be able to change its  universal  or
eternal characteristics?
57 I suggest we approach Mead’s account in connection with Dewey’s idea, surveyed earlier,
that “the writing of history is itself an historical event. It is something which happens
and which in its occurrence has existential consequences” (Dewey 1938: 236). So, a deeper
question here is who “we” are or who this “we” to whom knowing the past involves a
complete change of their own existence is.  It is important, however, to bear in mind
Mead’s  contribution  to  social  psychology  as  conveyed  by  what  he  called  “social
behaviorism,”32 and its consequences for an understanding of human beings as subjects
thinking in communicative terms. That is, thought and knowledge emerge in novel ways
from the activity (interaction) of the organism with its environment. Of course, reality is
the reality of our experience in the present, but the present or presents are dense and
diverse  in  their  temporal  range;  they  imply a  future  and  a  past  to  which  we  deny
existence.33 The density of the present is manifest in its own identifying traits: becoming
and disappearing,  coming to be and ceasing to be.  Therefore,  experience (present,  the
specious  present,  or,  passage),  according  to  Mead,  is  a  vital  process  of  self-adjustment
between an organism and its environment.34 So, is the reality of the past of that organism
independent from it? Is there anything like a fixed and irrevocable past? Mead avoids the
skeptical challenge by posing the question in relation to our own experiences, so that the
past or pasts which we face are both revocable and irrevocable. They are irrevocable in
that even when historians can reconstruct what happened, and give an authenticated
explanation, they will prevent the reconstruction made by historians in the future from
differing from ours. But they are also revocable because the world of future historians
will not be able to differ from the present, unless it rewrites the past that is now behind
us. The end or meaning of “what it was” belongs to the same present in which that “what
it was” is explained. Such “what it was” is so for me or for us now, in our present, and will
eventually change into another present. In Mead’s words, “against this evident incidence
of finality to a present stands a customary assumption that the past that determines us is
there. The truth is that the past is there, in its certitude or probability, in the same sense
that the setting of our problems is there” (Mead 2002: 37).
58 Mead would concede that what already happened is irrecoverable. However, we need to
bring  the  real  past  face  to  face  with  the  present,  from  the  viewpoint  of  emerging
phenomena, of the occurrence of that very surfacing phenomenon. The past that we now
observe from this viewpoint is another past, a different one. Why is that so? By definition,
the things that emerge are not a necessary consequence of the past; before they emerged,
the past was in fact not a past of those things. Nevertheless, once they have emerged, the
connection with the past they followed can be discovered. In other words, the past can be
reconstructed, but that reconstruction is a redescription that shows the elements that
emerged in the present as following from that past (see Mead 2002: 36). As Mead has
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shown in “The objective reality of perspectives” (2002: 171), the reconstruction of the
past in a present is  part of  that happening,  as it  emerges from the process – a self-
adjusting process of the organism with its environment. Perspective does not consist in
thoughts from God’s viewpoint, or from one external to the process itself. Rather, it is a
novel  event,  undetermined  though  conditioned  by  the  environment  locating  the
problems that promote a redescription or articulation of the system. There is no idealism
(a pure game of ideas) or determinism (reality or past reality determining the ideas of
them). 
59 In 1965, Danto offered a completely different answer. He ignored Mead’s writings, and
therefore the contrast among them is an exercise in heuristic. Danto’s approach stems
from a very different way of conceiving the adequate method of posing philosophical
problems. As we have seen, pragmatism expresses the fundamental philosophical issue in
terms  of  how certain  beliefs  or  commitments  contribute  to  investigating  or  solving
concrete problems. Danto, on his side, contends that philosophical approaches are set in
terms of the identity of indiscernibles. Following the skeptical conjecture, it could be
possible that two objects which satisfy descriptions in terms of a Ming bowl – that is, two
materially indiscernible objects – do not belong to the same kind of object: one is genuine
and the other is just a reproduction.35
60 If we remove historical descriptions from our language, certain objects in the world –
such as an original Ming bowl inside the museum and the reproductions that decorate my
house – would be indiscernible.
61 If we restore historical descriptions in our language, they would be different objects: one
being an original Ming bowl, the other a reproduction, even if none of these differences
would be manifest to the anthropologically educated eye.
62 Danto invites us to note the extent to which our beliefs about the past penetrate the
language we use, even to describe contemporary objects with those descriptions: the so-
called  “present  world.”  The  skeptical  challenge  is  incompatible  with  any  ordinary
historical statement applied to the present world. If for one crazy second we believed that
the conjecture is true, then all historical statements would all of a sudden become false,
all the areas of language left out of the game, and we would lose interest in them, from a
historical point of view, both if our beliefs were true and if they were false.
63 It must be said that we are dealing with two sophisticated stances on knowledge of the
past and of history, which take seriously into account the fact that historians are also
historical agents, that historical perspective is a part of history, and that it is up to every
history  to  tell  or  narrate  histories  that  are  not  only  true,  but  also  relevant  to  the
historian’s  present.  Precisely  Danto  repeated  over  and  over  again  that  “to  exist
historically is to perceive the events one lives through as part of a story later to be told”
(Danto 1985: 343). Nevertheless, Dewey’s and Mead’s considerations must be appreciated
in the context of a deep criticism of fundamentalism, of atomistic empiricism, and of the
mind/world dualism. Because no concept has a denotation that goes beyond the given. It
is as if  Danto had remained trapped in the “given vs.  constructed” dualism, whereas
pragmatism, by virtue of its interest in the basic nature of the idea of “activity,” advances
towards a notion of knowledge as the activity of an organism in its environment.  As
pragmatist  philosopher  Richard  J.  Bernstein  has  noted,  these  early  considerations
successfully avoided the “Cartesian anxiety” informing the search of  an independent
reality as the grounds for knowledge. Once the ontological heterogeneity (or dualism)
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between mind and body (world)  has been established, the problem of  its  connection
becomes unsolvable (Bernstein 1983: 31).
 
Conclusion 
64 From the perspective of a narrativist, pragmatistically-informed philosophy of history,
our  engagement  with  Dewey  and  Mead’s  thoughts  about  history  has  taught  us  the
following lessons. 
65 The meaning of statements in the past tense implicitly refers to the present and the
future.  Understanding  and  evaluating  them  entails  deploying  and  pondering  the
consequences  of  accepting  them  for  future  action.  By  developing  this  thesis,  we
encountered  Dewey’s  historical-narrative  conception  on  knowledge  as  an  activity  of
inquiry. A given judgment cannot be analyzed in terms of singular propositions about
events, but instead it should be regarded as the transformation of the indefinite into
something  determinate.  Dewey and  Mead  did  not  conceive  reflecting  on  historical
knowledge other than within their inquiries about agents acting in their environment,
which places them in concrete problems. According to this, certain questions that were
supposed to be substantial and fundamental become useless for inquiry, such as those
about the role that belief in the reality of a past independent from our beliefs about it
plays in determining the truth of such beliefs.36 
66 Applying  these  considerations  to  the  specific  problem  of  how  to  choose  between
antagonistic  interpretations  of  the  past  requires  us  to  deploy the  consequences  that
follow from each one, with the concrete aim of bringing to light precisely the features
which  make  them antagonistic.  Literary  analysis  of  intentional  language  or  motives
comes to our aid for this task.
67 As for the consequences of this, the point is that these conditionals are endless. This can
be read in two ways. One of them, extremely narrow and even malicious in a way, would
stress that if meaning is related to justification, and if this depends on fulfilling a specific
interest in the given context, then once the interest is fulfilled this would be enough for
justification.  As  a  consequence,  when we face two alternative  interpretations,  to  the
extent to which each one satisfies the interest of those promoting it, either they are both
justified, or the notion of justification is not applicable in any interesting way. Hence
relativism and arbitrariness (Wilkins 1959).
68 But there is  a  second,  more fair  and productive reading.  The justification process  is
unfinished,  and  any  consideration  has  an  undetermined  number  of  possible
consequences. And this is not only the case from a logical and abstract point of view, but
also from a heuristic one, that is, from the point of view of the practice of inquiry itself.
This cannot in fact be reduced to the logic of inference between atomic and isolated
propositions, but rather it answers to the logic of questions and answers of social beings
situated in concrete contexts which face them with concrete problems.
69 In this paper, I have faced a double challenge. On the one hand, I attempted to show that
nowadays a pragmatist philosophy of history (inspired by Dewey and Mead), concerned
with the consequences that follow from our assertions about the past, is unlikely to be
alien to the proposals of new NPH, particularly the orientation which has focused its
attention on narrative writing of history, and turned to literary theory with the purpose
of pondering the consequences of the diverse descriptions of our past human world. On
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the  other  hand,  I  sought  to  stress  how  narrative  philosophy  of  history  would  be
strengthened by taking up pragmatism seriously.
70 The lengthy analysis of The man who shot Liberty Valance allowed us to appreciate the deep
complexity  of  solving a  historical  problem,  even in the case  of  those referred to  an
allegedly concrete historical event which, precisely because of this, should not be too
arduous. Nevertheless, its resolution does not only involve a factual aspect: answering the
question of “which bullet caused LV’s death?” requires taking decisions about the very
language in which the events  will  be  framed,  depending on the importance of  their
resolution for the present or for a moment subsequent to the event. As a consequence,
this matter is inherently related to another question: “what difference would determine
which bullet caused the death make for our future decisions?” Common sense would have
that we are in the presence of two different kinds of questions, since one depends on
what actually happened, independently of our interests, whereas the other depends on
what our interests (or those of whoever actually poses the question) are. As they are
different questions, the logic of their justification is supposed to be different as well. One
depends on reality, while the other on values. Pragmatist philosophy will dissolve this
apparent difference without renouncing either the possibility of historical knowledge or
a rational reconstruction of controversies. But as we have tried to show, the basic choice
between a  language of  motives  (intentional)  and a  physicalist  one is  not  defined by
referring to the event itself in the past. The validity of the description, as well as its
understanding, requires deploying the future consequences of the descriptions we adopt
according to our problems of inquiry and to the processes to verify such consequences.
This  is  not  skepticism  or  lack  of  rationality;  rather  it  is  a  warning  about  all  the
implications of any given description; this is why we are committed to acknowledging its
consequences in the future. 
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NOTES
1. Translated by Moira Pérez.
2. I am talking about the explanation vs comprehension debate that took place mostly in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
3. I name the most remarkable ones.
4. The point on which pragmatism can shed some light is that the correctness or incorrectness of
any judgment or description of the past is not determined by something like the occurrence in
itself, but rather by the consequences that follow from a determining description or judgment. I
work this particular issue more in depth in Tozzi 2016. I will return to this matter in section 5.
5. Such are the cases of Erich Auerbach, Kenneth Burke, Northrop Frye, Roman Jakobson, and we
should also mention the works of Gombrich and Goodman on theory and philosophy of arts. 
6. See Murphey 2009.
7. See  White  (1999:  2),  where  he  distinguishes  information  about  the  past  and  historical
discourse, and White 2014, where he distinguishes the practical and the historical past. See also
Ankersmit  1983 and 1994 where he distinguishes  historical  research (questions  of  facts)  and
historical writing (questions of interpretation). 
8. See Ankersmit, Domanska & Kellner 2009; Doran 2013; Tozzi 2013; Fogu & Pihlainen 2014.
9. In Dewey 1922 (reprinted in 1983) and 1938. NPH is a reaction to the dismissal of narrative
history that took place in the first part of the twentieth century. The so called “Covering Law”
model (in philosophy) and the École des Annales (in history) considered Narrative History as a pre-
scientific activity. What makes Dewey’s account the most interesting one is the fact that he saw
neither a fault in the narrative way of historical writing nor the necessity of some alternative
logical reconstruction of historical inquiry. There is another interesting fact: his specific remarks
on the writing of history reveal his watchful eye on the historical practice, enabled by his active
participation in  historical  debates  about  the  nature  of  history  with  other  historians.  On the
relationship between Dewey and American historians see Blau 1960 and Wilkins 1959.
10. Dewey (1922: 314). 
11. Mead 2002.
12.  I  arrived at  Mead through Habermas.  I  was very interested in the connection he makes
between Mead’s  Mind,  Self,  and  Society and other  social  theories  interested in  communicative
aspects of common world and social relationships (Mead, Schütz, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, and
Winch). Then I discovered The Philosophy of the Present, and I found myself completely surprised
because one of the main skeptical arguments discussed by Danto in his 1965 work is the same
argument discussed by Mead in this book, but Danto ignored Mead, and never quoted him. On the
other hand, I  discovered Dewey’s text on the philosophy of history through Danto. He treats
pragmatism as an example of skepticism. (I discuss Danto’s account in sections 4, 5, and 6). As the
reader can see, I studied these two authors in the context of the philosophy of social sciences and
of history past the linguistic turn.
13. Ford appoached the dichotomy between telling the truth about the past or telling the most
useful story for the Nation in two movies: Fort Apache (1948) and The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance
(1962).  Both  movies  lead  the  same moral  (the  most  useful  stroy  is  the  one  to  be  told).  The
difference between them is that one of the main characters in Fort Apache, Liutenant Colonel
Owen Thursday (Henry Fonda), is a fictionalized version of General George Armstrong Custer,
and the events depicted in the movie make reference to “[Custer’s] reckless expedition into sioux
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territory in 1876 that led to the massacre of the entire battalion of Seventh Cavaltry at the Little
Bighorn” McBride (2001: 449-50). On the other hand, the plot of The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance
was  adapted  from  a  short  story  written  by  Dorothy  M.  Johnson  (1953)  and,  of  course,  the
controversial event is not a historical event for us but it is a historical event in the film. I have
chosen to work on the 1962 film because although the past event is not a historical event (and
the researchers depicted in the movie are journalists, not academic historians), the case remind
us of Collingwood’s well-known crime story “Who killed John Doe?” through which Collingwood
illustrates the work the historian does with evidence, using the “logic of questions and answers”
as the correct method of enquiry (Collingwood 1994).
14. Or, a third option he could have evaluated the issue from a strictly personal point of view,
that is, paying attention to what he, as a moral agent, should do beyond convenience or utility.
15. Giving a deeper but complementary account to his earlier reflections from 1922.
16. In fact, as we will see at the end of this section, Danto’s criticism of pragmatism (as a form of
skepticism) is grounded in his compromise with representationalism. 
17. “[T]here  are  no  different  kinds  of  judgment,  but  distinguishable  phases  or  emphases  of
judgment,  according  the  aspect  of  its  subject-matter  that  is  emphasized.  In  the  opening
statement existential transformation is the point of emphasis” Dewey (1938: 220). “Existential
subject-matter  as  transformed  has  a  temporal  phase. Linguistically,  this  phase  is  expressed  in
narration […] all changes occur through interactions of conditions. What exists co-exists, and no
change can either occur or be determined in inquiry in isolation from the connection of  an
existence with co-existing conditions” (Dewey 1938: 220, emphasis added).
18. Dewey, Mead, and Danto all rejected the account of present time as an atomic instant. They
considered the present as thick present or specious present. See Dewey (1922: 309); Mead (2002:
35); and Danto (1985: 84). Mead talks about the present as passing. Danto talks about past-referring
terms (like scar, widow or divorced), which describe some present feature but they can only be
rightly attributed in the case of specific events having occurred in the past – being wounded in
the first case, married in the second. See Danto (1985: 71).
19. Let’s pay attention to the similarity between this sentence from Dewey and White’s account
on documentary evidence. The latter says that his thought about “historical discourse does not
imply  that  past  events  never  really  existed  [or]  that  we  cannot  have  more  or  less  precise
information about these past entities […] information about the past is not in itself a specifically
historical kind of information […]. Such information might better be called archival, inasmuch as
it can serve as the object of any discipline simply by being taken as a subject […] it is only by
being made into the subject of historical discourse that our information about and knowledge of
the past can be said to be historical” (White 1999: 2). 
20. I need to make clear a point about Dewey’s notion of narration. As I have already said at the
beginning of this section, Dewey introduced the concept in the context of his logic of inquiry and
in the context of the theory of the temporal and historical phase of judgment. However, it is
important  to  note  that  his  account  on  historical  writing  expresses  the common  sense  of
historicist ideas of historical research. For that reason, it is very difficult not to connect these
few pages on history to the ideas of those thinkers who were critical of positivism (like Croce or
Collingwood). The similarity between Dewey’s text on the writing of history and Collingwood’s
“epilegomena”  is  remarkable,  both  of  them  were  critic  of  the  common  sense  belief  in  the
authority of personal memory and witness testimony to corroborate historical interpretations.
According  to  Collingwood,  “historical  image”  (or  narration)  is  constructed  and evaluated  by
historians in response to the interrogations of their age. On the other hand, every answer will
give place to new questions. Historians themselves are part of the historical process and each age
poses  new  and  different  problems.  Historical  testimony  changes  with  each  change  of  the
historical method, each new generation has to rewrite history in its own terms because it has to
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review its questions. The interesting thing about these remarks is to point out to the fact that
Dewey found those ideas of history compatible with his logic of inquiry.
21. In the present paper I am not providing an in-depth account of Lewis’ thoughts. I refer to
Lewis because Danto presented his criticism against pragmatism by discussing Dewey and Lewis,
and I  refer to some of Lewis’s  insights on knowledge of the past only when they are clearly
connected with some of Dewey’s similar insights. On the other hand, I am completely aware that
Lewis  deserves  a  special  space (which I  do not  have here),  but,  more importantly,  I  am not
claiming that Lewis’ pragmatism is similar to Dewey’s.
22. Danto explains his account on the correct form of philosophical problems in Danto 1997.
23. See the definition of judgment at the beginning of section 3 above.
24. I want to make clear that Danto’s account of Dewey as a case of skepticism is completely
unfair. Danto’s view is not the result of either some misunderstanding or of the fact that both
philosophers belonged to different times and different philosophical movements. Although it is
true that Dewey predates the linguistic turn, he was explicit, on one hand, in his intention to
avoid  approaching  the  logic  of  inquiry  based  in  the  analysis  of  the  singular  proposition  in
isolation of the context of inquiry and its relation to the specific problem to be solved, and, on
the  other  hand,  in  rejecting  dualism  and  representationalism,  because  they  both  lead  to
skepticism.
25. I will not consider, for the moment, whether all these sentences are descriptions of the same
event. I will return to the question of what would be a “naked” event devoid of any description a
little later.
26. “Their most general characteristic is that they refer to at least two time-separated events
though they only describe (are only about) the earliest event to which they refer” (Danto 1985:
143).
27. A contemporary witness is not allowed to truthfully describe events if that description refers
to a future event. 
28. White took in account Burke’s pentad and tropology in Metahistory in order to disclose the
basic ontologies that inform the differences among several historical accounts. 
29. This argument is not strictly general given that statements that refer to the past five minutes
are not affected. But, as Danto himself states, what historian would be interested in that brief
moment of time? See Danto (1985: 31).
30. Danto’s notion of present implies extension, duration, and speciousness. “To be a thing is to
have extension and duration, and to deny either of these is to deny the existence of things […]
and surely one must run a race on order ever to be said to have won one” (Danto 1985: 84-5).
31. Mead vaguely attributes to Father Gosse, a 19th Century creationist, the idea that the world
might have been created only five minutes ago.
32. By virtue of its behaviorist approach, Mead’s theory overcomes introspection, Cartesianism
and idealism. Through its social approach, it surpasses the individualism to which Watsonian
behaviorism remained attached. Mead 1972.
33. “The specious present of a human individual would presumably be a period within which he
could be himself” (Mead 2002: 49).
34. As I argued in Tozzi 2012, emergentism is, first of all, a kind of historical heuristic, since it
allows  us  to  track  the  appearance  of  human faculties  and processes  of  extreme complexity,
without presupposing an individual or a mind apart from the process of emergence itself, and
without appealing to any a priori contents. It thus enables the dissolution of dualisms such as
subject/object,  mind/world,  individual/society.  Secondly,  it  invited  the  dissolution  of  the
dualism between historical knowledge (unfixed, changing and discontinuous) and the actual past
(fixed and irrevocable) at the roots of historical skepticism. 
35. In other words, both bowls satisfy, from a material point of view, the narrative sentence that
refers to a past event (or object) Ming China (Danto 1985: 335).
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36. When I talk about “our beliefs about our world” I mean personal beliefs of our own past and
historical interpretations, memory politics and substantive philosophies of history. That is, all
account of the past interested in its truth as well as in its meaning.
ABSTRACTS
The second half of the twentieth century has been witness to a blooming of reflections on the
status of historical narrative. One of the main achievements of a narrativist philosophy of history
(NPH) consists of having reinforced the worth of an autonomous historical knowledge vis à vis
standard conceptions of science which made history appear as underdeveloped. Although NPH
does not dismiss the importance of documentary evidence, it  did not produce an integrative
account of both dimensions (the work of writing and the work with evidence), being slave of a
number of epistemological dualism. On one hand, NPH seems to remain in the representationalist
paradigm in the case of evidence, while, on the other hand, it only admits pragmatic evaluation
in the case of narrative discourse. In this paper, I sustain that John Dewey’s and George H. Mead’s
reflections on our knowledge of the past offer NPH good reasons to assess the role that literary
theory can play in reconstructing historical controversies, without neglecting the importance of
empirical research. For instance, Dewey holds that historical writing is a case of the judgments
produced  in  response  to  problematic  research  situations.  By  virtue  of  this,  the  meaning  of
judgments  referred  to  the  past  (that  is,  historical  narrations)  “have  a  future  reference  and
function,”  and  thus  understanding  their  meaning  involves  displaying  the  consequences  that
follow from such judgments. Mead, for his part, has argued that by appealing to the independent
reality of the past as ground for our beliefs about it, rather than contributing to the rational
resolution of  our historical  problems,  we stray towards the search of  something which is  by
definition  unattainable.  As  a  consequence,  I  shall  show  the  urgency  of  advancing  in  the
development  of  a  narrativist,  pragmatistically-informed  philosophy  of  history.  My
considerations will be illustrated through the analysis of a controversial case about a past event:
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